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We use the hyperbolic discounting model as the model that saving of each household varies
in the steady state. In this model, there is a trade off that consumers will decrease future
consumption and saving because of their temptation of current consumption. Therefore the
degree of commitment technologies fixes consumption and saving paths. In this paper, we
consider data of life planning as the commitment period of consumption and make an
empirical analysis using the data about life planning of Public Opinion Survey on Household
Financial Assets and Liabilities. We use the Tobit TSLS. We get the result that there exists
the short-run trade off between consumption and saving, therefore consumers can increase
their future consumption and saving by life planning. This result supports the hyperbolic
discounting theory.
We use the data in Public Opinion Survey on Household Financial Assets and Liabilities with the permission of the central
council for financial services information (secretariat: public relations department, bank of Japan). All the remaining error and
opinions in this paper is due to the author and not to the bank of Japan.
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Saving  of  household  follows  the  lifecycle  and  permanent  income  hypothesis.   
Particularly, variables such as assets and consumption which decide saving rate are 
dependent on whether households make life planning or not, how long they consider 
the life planning period.    They are choice variables of each household.    In short, 
each  household  can  achieve  the  desirable  combination  of  higher  consumption  and 











For  analyzing  thrift,  we  assume  the  hyperbolic  discounting  growth  model 
(Strotz(1956), Phelps & Pollak（1968）, Barro（1999）, Laibson（2003）).    In this 
model,  the  time  preference  rate  varies  with  the  time  distance  from  consumption 
planning  date.    So,  if  consumers  have  commitment  technologies  to  withhold 
consumption  they  can  increase  their  saving  (see  Barro(1999)).    The  commitment 
technology has two cases; partial and full.    They are distinguished by T, the period 
consumers  can  commit.    If  the  period  is  infinite,  commitment  is  full.    If  not, 
commitment is partial.    The full commitment case is asymptotically equivalent to the 
Ramsey model with a constant time preference rate.    The commitment period of each 
household  is  determined  by  saving  motives  and  the  existence  of  illiquid  assets, 
children and other commitment technologies. 
In this paper, we use the Tobit TSLS framework with saving and life planning.    In 
this model, the life planning period is endogenously determined by saving, dummy 
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Tobit means that there is some “desirable life planning period” different from using 
Probit which means that whether consumers make life planning depends on 1-0 index 
function.    Asymptotically, estimators of Tobit have a consistency (Lee et al.(1980)).     
Our  result  supports  the  hyperbolic  discounting  theory  that  life  planning,  i.e., 
commitment makes saving higher to the optimal in the steady state. 
2.The Model 
2.1. Consumer 
The following model is explained in Barro(1999).    We set the consumer’s utility 
function as follows. 
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τ  means the current time and we assume that the felicity function has the property 
0 ) ( '   c u ,  0 ) ( ' '   c u .    The  ordinal  time  preference  rate  is  ρ>0.    We  assume 
CRRA as the felicity function. 
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The time preference rate at t depends on not only the time distance t-τ  but also  φ
(t-τ)≧0.    The latter term shows the term which are not defined in the exponential 
time  preference  rate  exp(-ρ(t-τ)),  φ(0)=0.    The  time  distance  is  v=t-τ≧0. 
0 ) ( '   v   , 0 ) ( ' '   v   , and  if  v→∞  then  ) ( ' v   →0.    Therefore, the time preference 
rate is high in the near future and stays the low constant rate  ρ  in the long run. 
        (i) The complete solution in the no commitment case 
Using  the  above  utility  function,  consumption  is  given  by  c(t)=λ[k(t)+present 
value of wage] for t≧τ+ε  for small constant  λ>0.    In t≧τ+ε, consumption 
c(t) grows at the rate of r(t)-λ. 
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  for t>τ 
λ  is the instantaneous time preference rate.    In the case of Ramsey model,  λ=ρ
（φ(v)=0,for any v）.    λ  is given as; 
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ρ≦λ≦ρ+ ) 0 ( '     means that  λ  is between the long-term time preference rate 
ρ  and the short-run instantaneous time preference rate  ρ+ ) 0 ( '   .  
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        (ii) The role of commitment 
When the time preference rate is constant as in the Ramsey model, the commitment 
has no difference in the result, but has a large difference in the result when the time 
preference rate is time varying. 
        (Full commitment case) 
In the Steady State,  λ≧ρ  if there is no commitment and asymptotically constant 
time preference rate  ρ  if there is full commitment.    If there is no commitment,  λ 
is the average of the current and future instantaneous time preference rate.    If there is 
commitment, the  time  preference  rate  is  not  λ  but  ρ+ ) 0 ( '   ,  it  decreases  to  ρ 
over time.    In the full commitment case, the result is low r* and high k* and c*.   
Consumption varies as in the below equation. 
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  for t>τ 
(Partial commitment case) 
Households can choose the consumption path at time  τ  in the interval T≧0, [τ,
τ+T].    λT depends on T. 
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λT   decreases  monotonically  fromλ0  to  ρ  as  T  increases  from  0  to  infinity.   
Households  with  better  commitment  technology  have  the  more  valuable  T  and 
accumulate  capital  with  low  and  efficient  time  preference  rate,  low  consumption 
propensity, high saving propensity.    The difference of commitment ability is modeled 
as changes of T and produces the transition period. 
        At first, assuming T=0, in the interval [τ,τ+T],  ρ≦λ0≦ρ+ ) 0 ( '   。 
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  for  τ≦t≦τ+T 
At time  τ,  λ0 is equal toρ+ ) 0 ( '     and gradually reduces toρ+ ) ( ' T     at time T.   
Therefore,  λT≦λ0.    Consumption  varies  as  the  above  equation  and  experiences 
the discrete shift. 
3. Data and Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Data  
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In Public Opinion Survey on Household Financial Assets and Liabilities, we can 
use  the  annual  cross  section  data  in  Japan.    We  interpret  the  financial  asset  into 
saving.    In this data, we should care that saving is a  financial asset and does not 
include real assets like land, houses.    One of the dependent variables is answer to 
how long you consider as the life planning period in your future.    As independent 
variables, we use answers to (i) whether saving rate to the current income increased or 
not and why, (ii) what are saving motives.    These answers are converted into dummy 
variables 
3.2. Estimation 
In an empirical analysis, there are 2 regimes; case 1 of consumption planning and 
case 2 of no consumption planning.    Under these regimes, households accumulate 
savings.    These 2 regimes are represented in the following estimation equations. 
        (1) (Regime 1)  i i i X y 1 1 1 1 '          
        (2) (Regime 2)  i i i X y 2 2 2 2 '          
X  is  an  independent  variable.    y1i  and  y2i  are  savings  of  households.    These  2 
regimes are divided by the next criterion function. 
        (3)  i i i i i y y Z C               ) ( ' 2 1  
  Either one of y1i and y2i is observed from data.    It depends on Ci≧0 or Ci<0.   
But, you should notice that the criterion function includes y1i-y2i.    To estimate  δ 
which represents saving changes to consumption planning, we need y1i and y2i for all 
the households.    At first, we substitute (3) into (1) and (2), we get the following 
estimation equation. 
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        This is rewritten as; 
        (5)  i i i Z C        
* *'  
        For 2SLS, we define as follows; 
        (6) Ii=1 if C>0, Ii=0 otherwise 
Using this definition, we estimate  γ*’ by Tobit.    Next, to estimate  β1   and  β2, 
we estimate the next equation. 
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        From (1), (2), using the result of (7), we rewrite them as follows.    We consider  
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households  that  have  no  saving  and  we  do  not take  a  logarithm  of  saving  in  the 
estimation. 
        (8)  i i u i i u W X y 1 1 1 1 1 1 '            
        (9)  i i u i i u W X y 2 2 2 2 2 2 '            
        Estimating these equations, we get the computed value for every observation.   
        (10)  i i X y 1 1 1 ' ˆ ˆ     , i i X y 2 2 2 ' ˆ ˆ      
Using  them,  we  estimate  (3)  again  and  get  δ.    This  is  the  value  we  need.   
Judging whether this value is significant or not can test whether commitment, which is 
equal to the life planning period, increases saving or not.    The estimation result is in 
the next section. 
3.2.3.    Result 
We use Tobit considering that the time span of each household for life planning is 
different  among  households,  since,  data  shows  that  the  shortest  period  is  “1  or  2 
years” and the largest period is “more than 20 years.” 
From the final results of table 1,  δ(coefficient of Q3AC) is significant and the life 
planning period means important. In table 1, in saving objectives, “For education of 
children,”  “For  buying  a  house  (including  land)  or  extension  or  reconstruction  of 
house,” “For a life of old age,” “For travel, leisure” and “For taxes” are significant 
and  particularly  “For  a  life  of  old  age”  has  the  largest  coefficient.    These  are 
intuitively right motives from the result of LCH/PIH hypothesis.    A child is a kind of 
durable goods and “For education of children” confirms that.    The result shows that 
saving motives are themselves important as deciding the life planning period. 
In  table  3,  debt  (Q12X)  is  not  significant.    Households  are  more  myopic  when 
households get older and that existence of owning houses (Q16) has a positive effect.   
The significance of housing is a kind of commitment technology since it is not a liquid 
asset.    The household income is significant.    This is because other variables have 
common  effects on the  dependent  variable  as  household  income.    The  number  of 
household is also negative and significant.    That is intuitive result that the probability 
of temptation of current consumption increases as the number of people in household 
increases. 
Last, the theory predicts that it takes a long time to have an effect of thrift on saving 
(Barro(1999)).    Since  the  difference  of  saving  is  not  always  significant  in  the 
younger generation, we may estimate by cohort.    Actually, in Public Opinion Survey 













Share  3.6  13.1  20.6  28.4  21.5  13.1  8.5  12.8 
Clearly from the table, the share of younger generation is small.    It means that the 
difference  of  saving  tend  to  be  significant  in  estimation  and  helps  to  support  the 
theory. 
Appendix Data 
        Question: What is your purpose for saving? (you can choose up to 3 choices) 
Variable  Dummy  Choices 
Q901  1 or 0  For diseases or untimely disasters 
Q902  1 or 0  For education of children 
Q903  1 or 0  For marriage of children 
Q904  1 or 0  For  buying  a  house  (including  land)  or  extension  or 
reconstruction of house 
Q905  1 or 0  For a life of old age 
Q906  1 or 0  For durable goods (cars, furniture, home electronic appliances) 
Q907  1 or 0  For travel, leisure 
Q908  1 or 0  For taxes 
Q909  1 or 0  For a bequest 
Q910  1 or 0  For a peace of mind (no motive) 
Q911  1 or 0  Others 
Other questions used for independent variables in estimation are “In your household, 
does  your  current  saving  increase  or  decrease  compared  to  one  in  the  last  year? 
(Choose one), (a) What is the reason of increase? (You can choose any number of 
them.),    (b) What is the reason of decrease? (You can choose any number of them.),” 
“Household attributes.”    They are used for TSLS and not used in final estimate of the 
criterion function. 
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